The Venezuelan Navy’s recently revealed submarine is small, unarmed and short ranged. Yet it could pose an asymmetrical threat to U.S. interests in the Caribbean. This is because it is a type of submarine designed for diver-lock-out work, meaning that it can be used to transport underwater saboteurs.
The divers could attack ships with limpet mines in the manner of World War Two frogmen. But a more modern target might be undersea communications cables. In other words, the internet.
After years of economic troubles, sanctions and a near civil-war situation in the country, the Venezuelan Navy (Armada Bolivariana de Venezuela) is a shadow of its former self. Historically it has been relatively well equipped with frigates and submarines. But the sanctions and turmoil have hit hard. Its two conventional submarines haven’t been to sea in years.
The most modern warships are patrol ships built in Spanish shipyards. But when one of these modern warships, the Naiguatá, attempted to board a cruise ship in April it ended badly. Naiguatá was crushed by the civilian ship’s ice hardened bow and sank. That embarrassing incident did not reflect well on the Venezuelan Navy.
The mini-submarine is different; it may pose a more credible threat. The sea floor is crisscrossed with internet cables and other fiber-optic communications. A key location in the Caribbean is the U.S. territory of Guantánamo Bay. Several fiber optic cables are known to land there. And there are many other cable links within reach of Venezuelan ships.
The Italian designed VAS-525 mini-submarine is relatively deep diving, able to reach down 525 feet. It carries three divers who can leave the submarine, conduct the mission, and return. They could carry cutting devices or small explosive charges.
To be most effective the attack would have to be made out to sea, in relatively deep water, to make it harder to repair. Undersea internet cables are often damaged by ships anchor’s but this is usually close to shore. Consequently they can be fixed quickly. But an attack in deeper water, especially if repair vessels feel under threat, could be more disruptive.
Conducting an attack would not be easy for Venezuela however. The mini-submarine would have to be carried to the target area somehow. The Venezuelan Navy’s submarines are inoperable so they couldn’t carry it. And anyway, while it is conceivable, using a submarine to launch another submarine is likely to be beyond the Venezuelan Navy’s capabilities.
Using warships would be difficult to conceal, and the area is heavily patrolled by U.S. Navy assets. But civilian vessels could act as a mothership. The mini-submarine can be towed into position in a special floating barge which has a hole in the middle for the mini-submarine to be lowered into the water. Venezuela is believed to have one of these. However a crane could also be used to lift the sub in and out of the water. This option might be easier to conceal from prying eyes.
Attacking the internet cables during peacetime could be used as a means of hybrid warfare. The Russian Navy for example has developed sophisticated methods of using submarines to interfere with the cables. And last year the spy ship Yantar, known for loitering around undersea cables, was in the Caribbean. The Venezuelan Navy does not have the tools or practice of the Russians, but if motivated it could try to inflict a blow against other country’s undersea cables. The VAS-525 mini-submarine gives them a way to do it.
